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1 Introduction
We consider the problem of distributing a non-negative amount of a perfectly divisible
good among a finite set of agents who have single-peaked preferences, i.e., up to a
certain amount an agent likes to consume more of the good, beyond this amount
the opposite holds. This problem has been studied extensively in the literature.
Sprumont (1991) initiated the axiomatic analysis by characterizing the uniform rule.
He showed that the uniform rule is the unique rule which satisfies Pareto optimality,
strategy-proofness and either envy-freeness or anonymity. Ching (1994) shows that
the anonymity property can be replaced by the weaker property of equal treatment
and provides an alternative proof. Other axiomatizations of the uniform rule are
given in Thomson (1991a) using the well-known principles of consistency and converse
consistency. As a result of this extensive analysis, the uniform rule is now considered
to be the most interesting rule for this type of problems.
In this paper we give two new characterizations of the uniform rule, both of which
are inspired by the axiomatizations of two different bargaining solutions. In section 2
we associate with each economy an auxiliary bargaining problem, of which the set of
efficient allocations coincides with the set of efficient divisions in the original economy.
Next we show that the division recommended by the uniform rule to each economy,
coincides with the allocation recommended both by the Nash and the lexicographic
egalitarian bargaining solutions to the associated bargaining problem. The proofs are
interesting because they use the principles of consistency and converse consistency
in different contexts, namely in the context of bargaining problems on the one hand,
and of the allocation of a commodity among agents with single-peaked preferences on
the other hand. Moreover, they illustrate that consistency and converse consistency,
which have been employed in axiomatic characterizations of game theoretic solution
concepts (for example, Sobolev (1975), Peleg (1985, 1986), Lensberg (1988), Peleg
and Tijs (1992) to mention just a few), can be helpful for other purposes as well. Both
our results suggest that the uniform rule might be characterized by means of some
suitably adapted set of axioms that characterize the bargaining solutions mentioned
above. Section 3 provides two characterizations of the uniform rule. One uses axioms
reminiscent to those used by Nash (1950) to axiomatize the Nash bargaining solution2
and the other uses axioms inspired by the axiomatization of the lexicographic egal-
itarian bargaining solution by Chun and Peters (1988). More specifically, the first
characterization is based on an independence of irrelevant alternatives axiom, and
the second one is based on a restricted monotonicity axiom.
2 The uniform rule
2.1 The model
Let 1 C N be a non-empty set of agents and let M be some fixed positive number.
A coalition is a finite, non-empty subset of I. Given any preference relation R over
[0, M], i.e., a complete and transitive binary relation, we denote x R y if (x, y) E R,
x P y if x R y and not y R x, and x I y if x R y and y R x. R is called single-peaked if
there exists a number p(R) E[0, M] such that for all x, y E [0, M], with x C y C p(R)
or p(R) C y C x, we have y P a. p(R) is called the peak of the relation R. By TZ
we denote the set of all single-peaked preferences over [0, M]. The introduction of M
is just for notational convenience: It allows us to define peaks as a function only of
the preferences, i.e., independently of the amount to be divided. An alternative way
would be to define preferences over [0, oo), but then monotonic increasing preferences
would be excluded from the definition of single-peaked preferences unless we say that
in this case the peak is infinity.
An economy is a tuple E-C M, (R;);E,v ,, where 0 G M G M, N is a coalition,
and for each i E N, R; E 7Z. Denote p(E) :- (p(R;));EN. The class of all economies
is denoted by E. An economy represents the problem of allocating a positive amount
of a perfectly divisible good, which cannot be disposed of, among a group of agents
who have single-peaked preferences over [0, M].
Let N be a coalition and x E RN. If S C N, S ~ ~, then we denote
x(S) :- ~;ES x;, and xs :- (~;);es E Rs. For x, y E Rs we denote x C y (x G y) if
x; G y; (x; G y;) for all i E S.
Let E-G M, (R;);EN ) be an economy. An allocation for E is a vector y E Rt
such that x(N) - M. By X'(E) we denote the set of all allocations for E. An3
allocation x E X'(E) is called e,~cient if there is no y E X'(E) such that y; R; x; for
all i E N and y; P; x; for some i E N. X(E) denotes the set of all efficient allocations
for E.
Sprumont (1991) showed that an allocation for an economy is efficient if and only
if there are no two agents such that one gets more than his peak and the other gets less
than his peak. This means that an allocation is efficient if and only if all agents are
on the "same sider of their peaks. Formally, for an economy E-G M, (R;)ietv ~E E
and x E X"(E),
r x C p(E) if M C~iEN P(Ri)
xEX(E)aSl
x ~ p(E) if M? EiENP(Ri).
A rule is a function ~ which assigns to each economy E E~ an allocation
~(E) E X"(E), which can be interpreted as a recommendation for economy E.
A rule which plays a central role in the literature of economies with single-peaked
preferences is the uniform rule, see Sprumont (1991), Thomson (1991a,b,c, 1992a,b),
Ching (1992, 1994).
The uniform rule, U, is defined as follows. Let E-G M, (R;);EN 1E ~ and i E N.
Then
~ min{P(R;),a} if M C ~,iENP(~)
U`(E) ~- max{P(R;),a} if M ~ EiENP(~),
where a is such that U(E) E X'(E).
For the case in which there is too little to divide, i.e., M G~;EN P(R;), the uni-
form rule chooses appropriately an amount a and allocates it to every agent with
peak above this amount while all other agents obtain their peak. Here, appropriately
means that the resulting division is indeed an allocation. Note that the uniform rule
takes into account only the amount M and the peaks of the preferences of the indi-
vidua! agents.
One of the reasons why the uniform rule is interesting, is that it is the only rule
which satisfies many desirable properties. For example, it always recommends envy-4
free allocations. Moreover, the uniform rule is strategy-proof, i.e., if it is applied on
the basis of declared preferences, it is a (weakly) dominant strategy for each player
to declare his true preferences. We now discuss four other properties, which are also
satisfied by the uniform rule.
Let ~ be a rule.
Pareto optimality: ~ is Pareto optimal if ~(E) E X(E) for all E E ï.
M-Monotonicity: ~ is M-monotonic if for all economies E-G M, (R;);EN ~E E,
and E' -G M', (R;);EN ~E E~, with M G M', we have ~(E) G~(E'). t
Let E-G M, (R;);EN ~E E be an economy, x E X'(E), and S C N, S~ g. The
reduced econorny w.r.t. S and x is
ES'x :-G x(S), (R;);ES ~ .
Remark 2.1 Note that ES's E S. Further, if 0~ T C S, then ET~ -[ES.x]T'~s
A rule ~ is consistent if for all economies E-G M, (R;);EN ~E E, and all
S C N, S~ 0 we have, if x -~(E), then xs -~(Esf).
Roughly speaking, consistency of a rule means that, if a subgroup of agents would
decide to pool their parts oí the allocation prescribed by the rule and apply the same
rule to redistribute this total, then the agents in that group would end up each
with the same amount as before. Thomson (1991a) proved that the uniform rule is
consistent. For more details on the consistency principle the reader is referred to
Thomson (1990, 1991a).
A rule ~ is converse consistent if for all economies E E E and all x E X'(E) we
have, if xs -~(ES'x) for all S C N with ~S~ - 2, then x-~(E).
Converse consistency means that, given a certain allocation x for an economy,
if the restriction of x is recommended for every reduced economy with respect to a
subgroup oí two agents and x, then the allocation x is recommended in the large
economy. As a consequence of the following lemma we obtain that the uniform rule
is converse consistent.
' M-monotonicity is different from tóe 1-sided resource monotonicity introduced in Thomson
(19916). But if Pareto optimality is imposed both properties aze equivalent.5
Lemma 2.2 Let ~ be an M-monotonic rule. Then ~ is consistent if and only if (i)
for every economy E E ï there exists an x E X'(E) such that xs -~(Es~s) for all
S C N with ~S~ - 2, and (ii) ~ is converse consistent.
PmoJ. (~) Let E E E. Take x :- ~(E). Consistency of ~ yields that xs -~(EsF)
for all S C N with ~S~ - 2. In order to prove that ~ is converse consistent, it suffices
to show that there is no allocation y E X'(E), y~ x, such that ys -~(Es~y) for all
.S C N with ~S~ - 2. Suppose that there exists such a y . Since x(N) - y(N) - M,
it follows that there are i, j E N such that x; c y; and x~ 1 y~. Take S:- {i, j}.
W.l.o.g. we assume that x(S) ? y(S). M-Monotonicity of ~ yields that ~(Es~s) 1
~(Es~y). Hence, xs ~ ys, which yields a contradiction.
(G) Let E E S. Let 0~ T C N, and x-~(E). We have to prove that xT -~(ET~~)
By assumption there exists a y E X'(E) such that ys -~(Es~v) for all S C N with
~S~ - 2. Converse consistency of ~ yields that y-~(E) - x. Hence, xs - ~(Es~s) for
all S C N with ~S~ - 2. By remark 2.1, xs - ~([ETs]S'`T) for all S C T, with ~S~ - 2.
Clearly, xT E X`(ETF). Hence, converse consistency of ~ yields xT -~(ET~r). ~
2.2 Bargaining solutions
Before we state the main results of section 2, we first recall some notions from coop-
erative bargaining theory. Those who are acquainted with this theory may skip this
subsection.
Let N C I be a coalition. A óargaining pmblem for N is a subset B of Rf which
satisfies the following properties:
(i) B is compact and convex.
(ii) There exists a y E B with y~ 0.
(iii) B is comprehensive, i.e., if x E B, and y E Rt, with y C x, then y E B.
Let Ci denote the set of all bargaining problems. z
ZUsually, a bargaining problem is defined by a set B and a disagreement outcome d E B. Fors
A(bargaining~ solution is a function .i which assigns to each B E Ci an element
,~(B) of B.
A prominent solutíon is the Nash bargaining solution introduced by Nash (1950).
Let B E Ci be a bargaining problem for N. The Nash bargaining solution is defined
by
lV(B) :- argmax{ ~ x; ~ x E B}.
iE.N
Another bargaining solution is the lexicographic egalitarian solution. To define it
we need some notation.
Let cr : RN -~ RN be a tunction such that for each x E RN the vector a(x) is a
reordering of the coordinates of x in a non-decreasing order. So if i, j E N with i G j,
then o;(x) G cr~(x). The lexicographic maximin ordering Jtm on RN is defined by
x~~m y if a(z) ~~ ~(y), where 1~ denotes the lexicographic order on RN.
Thc lexicographic egalitarian solution, G : Ci ~ RN assigns to each bargaining
problem B E Ci the unique point which is maximal with respect to the lexicographic
maximin ordering ~~m.
It is well-known that both JV and .C satisfy the three properties listed below.
A solution .~ is Pareto optima! if for all B E Ci, and all y E B we have, if
y ~ .~(B), then y - .~(B).
A solution .1- satisfies strict individua! rationality if .~(B) ~ 0 for all B E L3.
Lensberg (1982) and Lensberg (1988) characterized the lexicographic egalitarian
solution and the Nash bargaining solution respectively, using a consistency property.
In order to introduce it we need the following definition.
Let B E Li be a bargaining problem for N, let x E B, and let S C N, S~ 0. The
reduced bargaining problem w.r.t S and x is
our analysis the disagreement outcome doea not play an explicit role: the reader may think of the
dieagreement outcome as being d- 0.7
Bs.s :- {ys E Rt ~(ys,xiv`s) E B}.
Note that not necessarily, Bs~s E B. However, if x- N(B) or if x- G(B), then
Bs~T E L3. This is a consequence of the fact that both N and G satisfy strict individual
rationality.
The consistency property is now defined as follows.
A solution .E is consistent if for all bargaining problems B E Li for N, and all
S C N, S~ 0 we have, if Bs~s E 13 where x-.~(B), then xs - F(Bs~s)
For the results in this section we are going to make use of the fact that both N
and G satisfy the consistency groperty. The results in the next section are based on
the characterizations of N and G by Nash (1950) and Chun and Peters (1988).
2.3 Two formulations of the uniform rule
Let E-C M, (R;)iEN ~ be an economy. Let p(E) denote the set of agents i E N
for which there is an x E X(E) such that x; ~ 0. Note that p(E) ~(~ if and only if
M~ 0. If one is interested in Pareto optimal rules, it is clear that the problem is,
how to divide the total amount M among the agents in p(E), for all efficient alloca-
tions give zero to the agents not in p(E). In other words, the set of agents which are
relevant for economy E is p(E).
We now state the main results of this section.
Theorem 2.3 Let E-c M, (R;);EN ~ be an economy. Then U(E) is the unique
element of argmax{rj;EPIE) yi I y E X(E)}, if p(E) ~ 0, and U(E) - 0, otherwise.
Theorem 2.4 Let E-C M, (R;);EN ~ be an economy. Then U(E) is the unique
efficient allocation for E which is maximal with respect to ~~m.
Instead of giving a direct proof of both theorems, we will give an indirect one
based on some properties of the uniform rule and the consistency property of both
the Nash solution and the lexicographic egalitarian solution.s
Prroofof theorems 2.3 and 2.4.
Clearly, both theorems hold if the economy consists of only one agent or if M- 0. So
from now on attention is restricted to economies with at least two agents and M~ 0.
For any such an economy E define B(E) :- compX(E). 3(See figure 1.)
figure l. The set B~E) in case E ás an economy with two agents.
Case 1: All agents are relevant.
Let E-G M, (R;);EN ~ be an economy with p(E) - N and ~N~ ~ 2. Since,
p(E) - N, and X(E) is a convex set, there exists a point y E X(E) with y~ 0.
Hence, B(E) is a bargaining problem. B(E) is called the bargaináng pmblem associ-
ated with E. 4
The following lemma shows that the operation of reducing an economy commutes
with the opecation of reducing an associated bargaining problem. It also implies
that, within this context, the consistency requirements for bargaining problems and
economies coincide.
3tompX(E) denotes the rompreAensrve hutf of X(F,), i.e., the aet of all y E Rf such that y C x
for some x E X(E).
~It should be noted that B(E) representa a aet of phyaical allocationa, whereas a bargaining
problem in the usual aense repreaents a set of utility n-tuplea.Lemma 2.5 Let E-G M, (R;);EN ~ be an economy with ~N~ ? 2 and p(E) - N.
Let S C N, S ~ 0, and x E X(E). Then
B(Es~T) - Bs~s(E).
Proof. We only prove the case ~;EN p(R;) G M. The other case is easier.
Since x E X(E), it follows that ~;ESp(R;) C x(S). Hence,
X(Es~s) -{y E R} ~ y(S) - x(S),y; ? P(R;) b'e E S}.
Let y E B(Es~s) - co~npX(Es~~). Then there exists a z E X(Es~s) with z 1 y. This
means that z(S) - x(S), and z; ~ p(R;) for all i E S, which implies (z, xN`s) E
X(E) C B(E). Hence, by definition of the reduced bargaining problem, it follows
that z E Bs~s(E). Since Bs~s(E) is comprehensive, we have y E Bs~~(E).
Now take y E Bs~s(E) - {y E R} ~ (y,xrv`s) E compX(E)}. Then there exists a
t E X(E) with t 1 (ys,xN`s) and t; 1 p(R;) for all i E S. Since trv`s ? xlv`s and
t(N) - x(N), it follows that t(S) C x(S). Hence, ts E comp{z E R~ ~ z(S) -
x(S), z; ~ p(R;) for all i E S} - B(Es~~). Since ts 1 ys, comprehensiveness of
B(Es~s) implies that ys E B(Es~s). Hence, Bs~(E) C B(Esf). 0
In order to prove theorems 2.3 and 2.4 for this case it is suf6cient to show that
U(E) - N(B(E)) - G(B(E)). (1)
First note that in case ~N~ - 2, it is immediately clear that U(E) - G(B(E)).
Furthermore, it is also straightforward to show that JV(B(E)) - G(B(E)).
Hence, it remains to show that (1) holds if ~N~ ~ 2. This will follow from lemma 2.6
below.
Let E' C S be the family of economies E with p(E) - N.
Lemma 2.6 Let .~ be a bargaining solution which satisfies Pareto optimality, strict
individual rationality, and consistency. If.~(B(E)) - U(E) for all E-G M, (R;);EN ~
E E' with ~N~ - 2, then .~(B(E)) - U(E) for all E E~'.
Pmoj. Let x:- .~(B(E)). From strict individual rationality we know that x 1 0 and
therefore, Bs~s(E) E 8. Moreover, by consistency of .~lo
xs -,E(Bs'T (E)) for all S C N, ~S~ -'l.
Furthermore, from Pareto optimality of .~ and the definition of B(E), it follows that
x E X(E). So by lemma 2.5, B(Es'~) - Bs'T(E) Hence,
xs -.E(B(Es~s)) for all S C N, ~S~ - 2.
Since B(Es's) - compX(Es'r) E Ci, it follows that there exists an y E X(Es's) with
y 1 0. So p(Es's) - S for all S C N, ~S~ - 2. Hence, by assumption
xs - U(Es's) for all S C N, ~S~ - 2.
Converse consistency of the uniform rule now yields
x - U(E).
0
Since both ~V and C are consistent, strict individually rational and Pareto optimal
bargaining solutions, which satisfy ( 1) in case E is an economy with two agents, it
immediately follows from lemma 2.6 that (1) holds for all E E S'. This ends the
proof of case 1.
Case 2: Not all agents are relevant.
To complete the proof of theorems 2.3 and 2.4 we consider an economy
E-c M, (R;);erv ~ with p(E) ~ N.
Let x:- U(E) and S:- p(E). S~~ since M 1 0. Pareto optimality of U implies
that xx`s - ON`s- Consistency of U implies that xs - U(Es~s). Clearly, p(Esf) - S.
So by case 1, we have xs - argmax{r[;ESy; ~ y E X(Es'T)}, and moreover, we have
that xs is maximal with respect to 1~m in X(Est). Since X(E) - X(Es~) x ON`s,
it immediately follows that U(E) -(xs,ON`s) - argmax{jj;ESy; ~ y E X(E)}, and
that x is maximal with respect to 1~m in X(E). 0
A similar kind of proof can be found in Aumann and Maschler (1985), who showed
that one bankruptcy rule, the contested garment consistent rule, can be defined asII
the nucleolus of an appropriately chosen TU-game. Theorem 2.3 can be seen as
a generalization of Dagan and Volij (1993) who showed that the constrained equal
award rule for bankruptcy problems corresponds to the Nash bargaining solution of
an appropriately chosen bargaining problem.
3 Two characterizations of the uniform rule
It is clear from the previous section that, at least formally, there is a relation between
the uniform rule on the one hand, and the Nash and the lexicographic egalitarian
bargaining solutions on the other hand. This suggests that the uniform rule might be
characterized by means of a suitable adaptation of some properties that characterize
these bargaining solutions. Before we go into axiomatic characterizations of the
uniform rule, we present some properties, most of which are satisfied by the uniform
rule.
Let ~ be a rule.
Equal treatment: ~ satisfies equal treatment if for all E-G M, (R;);EN ~
E E and all i,j E N, if R; - R„ then ~;(E)I;~1(E).
It is easy to see that together with Pareto optimality, equal treatment ímplies that
any two agents with identical preferences get the same physical amount of the good.
Peak only: ~ satisfies peak only if for all economies E-G M, (R;);EN ~, E' -G
M, (R;.);EN ~E ~, we have, if p(E) - p(E'), then ~(E) -~(E').
This property requires from a rule to take into consideration only the peaks of the
preference profile when dividing a certain amount M.
The following property, though different, is reminiscent to the one used by Nash
(1950) in his characterization of the Nash bargaining solution.
Independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIAJ: ~ satisfies IIA if for all economies
E-G M, (R;);EN ~, E' -G M, (R;);EN 1E h, with X(E) C X( E'), we have, if
~(E') E X (E), then ~(E) - rd(E').12
The IIA axiom makes sense only if ~ is Pareto optimal. It states that if all the eíficient
allocations in E are also ef6cient in E', then if ~ recommends for E' an allocation
that is efficient in E, it should recommend the same allocation for economy E. For
our results we need only a weaker version of IIA which requires independence only in
cases where in both economies either there is too much to divide or there is too little
to divide.
One-sided independence of irrelevant alternatives: ~ satisfies one-sided IIA if
for all E-G M, (R;);EN 1, E' -G M, (R;);EN ~E E', with X(E) C X(E') such
that maX{~,iENP(Ri), ~iENP(~)J G M Or min{~iENP(Ri), ~iENP(Ri)J ~
M the following condition holds: if ~(E') E X(E), then ~(E) -~(E').
Consider the following property:
Monotonicíty: ~ satisfies monotonicity if for all economies E-G M, (R;);EN ~
and E' -G M',(R;);EN ~, such that for each x E X(E) there exists an x' E
X(E')withx;R;x;foralliENwehave~;(E')R;~;(E)foralliEN.
This axiom states that if for every efficient allocation x in E we can find an efficient
allocation x' in E' such that x' is weakly preferred to x by all agents in E', then the
same must be true for the recommendations ~(E') and ~(E), namely ~(E') must be
weakly preferred to ~(E) by all agents in E'. This axiom is similar in spirit to the
monotonicity axiom of bargaining theory, and, like in bargaining theory, monotonicity
is incompatible with Pareto optimality, as the following lemma shows.
Lemma 3.1 There is no Pareto optimal rule ~ that satisfies monotonicity.
ProoJ. Let E, E' and E" be three two-agent economies in which there are 3 units to be
divided. The peaks of the preference relations are respectively, p-(1,2), p' -(2,1)
and p" -(3,3). By Pateto optimality of ~ we have that ~(E) -(1,2). It is clear that
X(E) C X(E"). Hence by monotonicity, we must have ~(E") -(1,2). A similar
argument shows that ~(E") -(2,1), which is a contradiction. ~
Lemma 3.1 shows that if we want to keep Pareto optimality, we must, as in
bargaining theory, weaken the monotonicity requirement. We are going to weaken13
the monotonicity axiom in two different ways. First, we are going to allow for non-
monotonicity only if one of the agents that got his peak in the smaller problem,
strictly prefers the recommendation for the bigger problem. Second, we are going to
require this restricted form of monotonicity only when comparing some very specific
economies.
One-sided restricted monotonicity: ~ satisfies one-sided restricted monotonic-
ity if for all economies E-G M, (R;);EN ), E' -G M, (R;);EN ~E ~, sat-
isfying X(E) C X(E') and either max{~;ENP(R;), ~;ENp(R,)} G M or
min{~;ENP('b), ~;ervP(R;)} ~ M the following condition holds: if
~;(E) R; ~;(E') for all i E N such that ~;(E) - p(R;), then ~;(E') R; ~;(E) for
alliEN.
In order to understand this axiom, note that ~;(E) - p(R;) means that it is
physically impossible to make agent i better off in economy E. In this case we say
that i's peak is binding at ~(E). One-sided restricted monotonicity says that given
two economies E and E' satisfying the conditions in the definition this property, if ~
does not behave monotonically, i.e., there is some agent in E' which strictly prefers
~(E) to ~(E'), then there must be some other agent in E', whose peak was binding
at ~(E), who strictly prefers ~(E') to ~(E). The reason for the non-monotonic
behavior must be that some agent whom we could not make better off in E, is
made bettet off in E'. The motivation for this axiom is the same as the one for the
restricted monotonicity satisfied by the lexicographic egalitarian bargaining solution
(Chun and Peters (1988)). For the case where the sum of the peaks is smaller than
M(for instance), it implies that either all agents in E' obtain the same amount as in
E, or there is an agent with binding peak in E, who gets less in E' than in E(follows
the direction of his peak).
The following lemma shows that there is a relation between the one-sided mono-
tonicity axiom and the one-sided IIA.
Lemma 3.2 Let ~ be a Pareto optimal rule. If ~ satisfies one-sided restricted mono-
tonicity, then ~ satisfies one-sided IIA.
Proof. Let E-G M, (R;);E~y 1, E' -G M, (R;);EN 1E E, be two economies satisfying14
X(E) C X(E'). We distinguish two cases.
~i88e ),: Inlll{~;ENP(`~)~ ~;ENP(~)} i M.
Assume ~(E') E X(E). Then by Pareto optimality of ~, we have
max{~;(E),~;(E')} C min{p(R;),p(R;.)} for all i E N.
Since X(E) C X(E'), it follows that
min{M,p(R;)} C p(R;) for all i E N.
(2)
(3)
Let i E N be such that ~;(E) - p(R;). Then it follows from (2) and (3) that
~;(E') C p(R;) -~;(E) C p(R,). This implies that ~;(E) R; ~;(E') for all i E N
with ~;(E) - p(R;).
Since ~ satisfies one-sided restricted monotonicity, it follows that ~;(E') R; ~;(E) for
all i E N. Since ~(E) E X(E'), we must have ~;(E') P~;(E) for all i E N. Since
both ~(E) and ~(E') are efficient in E' it follows that ~(E) -~(E').
C.a38 2: maX{~;ENP(R~)r L.;ENP(R;)} G M.
In this case X(E) C X(E') implies that p(E') G p(E). Let i E N be such that
~;(E) - p(R;). Then, since ~(E') E X(E), it follows from Pareto optimality of ~
that ~;(E') ~ p(R;) -~;(E) J p(R;). This implies that ~;(E) R; ~;(E') for all i E N
with ~;(E) - p(R;).
Sínce ~ satisfies one-sided restricted monotonicity, it follows that ~;(E') R; ~;(E) for
all i E N. Since both ~(E) and ~(E') are efficient in E', ít follows that ~(E) -~(E').
O
The following lemma will allow us to considerably simplify notation.
Lemma 3.3 Let ~ be a Pareto optimal rule. If ~ satisfies one-sided IIA, then ~
satisfic~ peak only.
Prooj Let E-G M, (R;);EN ~, E' -G M, (R,)iEN ~E E be two economies with
p(E) - p(E'). Then X(E) - X(E') and since ~ ia Pareto optimal, we have
~(E') E X(E) - X(E'). Hence, by one-sided IIA, ~(E) -~(E'). O
Lemmas 3.2 and 3.3 imply15
Corollary 3.4 Let ~ be a Pareto optimal rule. If ~ satisfies one-sided restricted
monotonicity, it also satisfies peak only.
It will follow from theorem 3.5 and from example (iii) below that the converses of
lemmas 3.2, 3.3 and corollary 3.4 are not true.
The following property imposes a restríction only when the solution satisfies peak
only.
Conditiona! p-continuity: A solution ~ is conditional p-continuous if the follow-
ing holds: if ~ is peak only, then it is continuous with respect to the peaks.
Note that conditional p-continuity is weaker than the continuity with respect to pref-
erences introduced by Sprumont (1991).
We are now ready to state the two main results of this section, which are charac-
terizations of the uniform rule, based on axioms inspired by the results of the previous
section.





Pmof It is clear that the uniform rule satisfies properties (i), (ii) and (iv). That the
uniform rule satisfies (one-sided) IIA follows immediately from theorem 2.3 above.
For each M E [0, ~, let ï(M) be the class of economies in which M is the amount
to be divided. Furthermore, let ~(M) :- {x E R} ~ x(N) - M}. For p E R~ let
S(p) :- {x E ~(M) ~ x C p or x~ p}.
Now let ~ be a rule satisfying the foregoing axioms. By lemma 3.3 ~ is peak only. Let
M E [0, M], and let N be a coalition. Define the following function f: Rt -~ 0(M)
by16
f(p) -~(E) for some E E E(M) with p(E) - p.
Since ~ is peak only, f is well-defined.
Since ~ satisfies (i)-(iv), the reader can easily verify that f satisfies the following
properties.
(A.1) f(p) E S(p) for all p E Rt.
(A.2) f,(p) - f~(p) for all p E Rt with p; - p~.
(A.3) for all p, q E Rt such that either max{p(N), q(N)} G M or min{p(N), q(N)} ~
M, we have, if' f(q) E S(p) C S(q), then f(p) - f(q).
(A.4) f is continuous in p.
To conclude the proof of theorem 3.5 it suffiices to show that for all p E R~
min{p;,~} if p(N) 1 M 4
f~(P) - max{p;, ~} if p(N) G M, O
where a is such that f(p) E ~(M).
Let p E R}. Assume p(N) G M(the case p(N) ~ M is similar, and the case
p(N) - M is trivial). (A.1) implies f(p) ~ p.
Define the following set of agents:
K:- {i E N I f;(P) ~ p;}.
Since p(N) G M, K~ 0.
The proof of (4) follows from the following four lemmas.
Lemma A: Let i E K and let 0 G q; C p;. Define q E Rt by
a; -
r pJ if j E N`{i}
Sl .f .
9t i J - 2.
Then f (q) - f (p).
Pmof Let17
a :- inf{z; E ~9;,P;~ ~ f(z;,P-;) - f(P)}.
Here, p-; denotes the vector pN`{;}.
By (A.4), it follows that f(a, p-;) - f(p). We prove that a- q;. Suppose, on the
contrary, that a~ q;. Since f;(a,p-;) - f,(p) ~ p;, it follows from (A.4) that there
exists an q; G a G a close enough to a, such that f;(a, p-;) ~ p;. By (A.1), we have
f~(a, p-;) ? p~ for all j E N`{i}. Hence, f(a, p-;) E S(p). Clearly, S(p) C S(a,p-;).
Therefore, by (A.3) we have f(a, p-; )- f(p), contradicting the definition of a. We
conclude that a- q;, and so it follows that f(q) - f(q, p-;) - f(p). ~
Lemma B: for all i, j E K we have f;(p) - f~(p).
Pmof. Let i, j E K, and let 0 G v- min{p;,p~}. Define q E Rf by
r pk if k E N`{i, j}
qk -
Sl v if k- i, j.
(A.2) yields that f;(q) - f~(q). From lemma A it now follows that f;(p) - f~(p). ~
Lemma C: For all i, j E N we have, if p; G p„ then f;(p) G f~(p).
Proof. Suppose that there exist i,j E N, with p; G p~ and f;(p) ~ f~(p). Define
q E R~ by
qk -
r pk ifkEN`{i}
Sl p~ if k- e.
From (A.1) and the definition of q it follows that qk - pk C fk(p) for k E N`{i}.
Moreover, from the assumption it follows that q; - p~ C f~(p) G f;(p). Hence, f(p) j
9, ~d ~kEN qk G L.kEN fk(P) - M. Therefore, f(p) E S(q) C S(p). (A.3) now yields
that f(p) - j(q). Hence using (A.2), we obtain f;(p) - f;(q) - f~(q) - f~(p), which
contradicts the assumption f;(p) ~ f~(p). ~
According to lemma B all agents in K obtain the same amount. Denote this amount
by a, i.e., f;(p) - a for all i E K.
We now have
Lemma D: p; ? a for all i E N` K.18
Pmof Suppose that there exists an i E N` K, with p; G a. Take j E K. By
definition of K and a we have f,(p) - p; C~- f~(p). Hence by lemma C, we have
p; G p~. Define q E Rt by
- r pk if k E N`{j}
qk -
Sl p; ifk-j.
By lemma A it follows that f(q) - f(p). (A.2) yields f~(p) - fj(q) - f;(q) - f;(p) -
p; G p„ which contradicts (A.1). 0
Now we show that (4) holds.
From lemma B and the definition of K and a it follows that
f,(p) - max{p;, a} for all i E K.
From lemma D and the definition of K we obtain
f;(p) - max{p;, a} for all i E N`K.
Since f(p) E ~(M), (4) holds. This completes the proof of theorem 3.5. ~
The following examples show that the properties (i)-(iv) in theorem 3.5 are inde-
pendent.
(i) The egalitarian rule ~' defined by ~'(E) -( ~M-,~, ..., ~N~ ) for all economies E-G
M, (R;);EN 1E E satisfies equal treatment, (one-sided) IIA, and conditional p-
continuity, but not Pareto optimality.
(ii) Let ~~ be defined as follows: for each E -G M, (R;);EN ~E ~
s U(E) 'f ~N~ ~ 2
~(E) -- argmax{x;,42~,4 ~ x E X(E)} if N- {i,j}, i G j.
~2 satisfies Pareto optimality, (one aided) IIA and conditional p-continuity, but
not equal treatment.
(iii) Let ~3 be defined as follows: for each E-G M,(R;);E~v 1E ~ and i E N19
~3(E) : U~(E) 'f EiENp(Ri) ? M
- p(R;) ~- ~ ,'~~(M - ~;EN p(R;)) otherwise.
~3 satisfies Pareto optimality, equal treatment, and conditional p-continuity,
but not (one-sided) IIA.
(iv) Let ~' be defined as follows: for each E-G M, (R;);E~r ~E ~
U(E) if ~N~ ~ 2
~'(E) :- argmin{x;x; ~ x E X(E)} if N-{i, j} and { z, M) ~ X(E)
( `y, M) otherwise.
~4 satisfies Pareto optimality, equal treatment and (one-sided) IIA, but not
conditional p-continuity.
The following theorem shows that if one-sided IIA is replaced by one-sided re-
stricted monotonicity in theorem 3.5, then we can drop conditional p-continuity.
Theorem 3.8 The uniform rule is the unique rule on E which satisfies
(i) Pareto optimality
(ii) Equal treatment
(iii) One-sided restricted monotonicity.
Pmof. It is clear that the uniform tule satisfies properties (i) and (ii). The following
lemma shows that it satisfies (iii).
Lemma 3.7 The uniform rule satisfies one-sided restricted monotonicity.
Pmof. Let E-C M, (R;);EN 1, E' -c M, (R;);EN ~E E, be two economies satisfying
max{~;ENp(R;), ~;ENP(R;)} C M(the other case is similar) and assume X(E) C
X(E'). Then p(E) 1 p(E'). For all i E N, let U;(E) - max{p(R;),a} and U;(E') -
max{p(R;), a'}. Define K:- {i E N ~ U;(E) ~ p(R;)} and assume U;(E) R; U;(E'),
for all i E N`K, i.e.,
U;(E) G U;(E'), for all i E N`K. (5)20
We need to show that U;(E') R; U;(E) for all i E N. Since
M-~ max{p(R;), ~'} -~ max{p(R;), a} ~~ max{p(R;), a},
iEN iEN iEN
it follows that a' 1 a.
Take i E K. It follows from the definition of K that p(R;) G p(R;) G~ G~'. Hence,
U;(E) G U;(E'). (6)
This together with assumption (5) implies that (6) holds for all á E N. But since
~;EN U,(E) -~;EN U;(E'), we have U;(E) - U;(E') for all i E N, which in turn
implies that U;(E') R; U;(E) for all i E N. o
Now let ~ be a rule satisfying the axioms (i)-(iii). By corollazy 3.4 ~ is peak only.
Let M E[0, M], and let N be a coalition. Analogously to the proof of theorem 3.5,
define the function f: R} ~ ~(M) by
f(p) -~(E) for some E E E(M) with p(E) - p.
Since ~ is peak only, f is well-defined.
The reader can easily verify that (i)-(iii) together with lemma 3.2 imply that f sat-
isfies, besides (A.1), (A.2) and (A.3) (see the proof of theorem 3.5), the following
property.
(A.5) for all p, q E Rt, with S(p) C S(q), and such that either max{p(N), q(N)} G M
or min{p(N),q(N)} ~ M, we have, if Ifi(P) - qi~ C ~fi(q) - qi~ for all í E N
such that f;(p) - p;, then ~f;(q) - q;~ C ~f,(P) - 4;~ for all i E N.
To conclude the proof of theorem 3.6 it sufíices to show that for all p E Rt
fi(P) - r min{p;,a} if ~iENPi ? M
l max{p;, a} if ~;EN p; C M,
where ~ is such that f(p) E ~(M).
Let p E R~. Assume p(N) G M(the case p(N) ~ M ie aimilaz, and the case
p(N) - M is trivial). (A.1) implies f(p) 1 p.
Define the following set of agents:21
K:- {i E N ~ fr(P) ~ Pt}.
Since ~iEN p~ c M, K~ 0.
Analogously to the proof of theorem 3.5 we now have
Lemma A': Let i E K and let 0 C q; C p;. Define q E R} by
r pk ifkEN`{i}
q; if k-i. Qk - St
Then f(q) - f(P)-
Proof From the definition of q it follows that S(p) C S(q). Suppose f(p) ~ f(q).
Since p, q E 0(M), it is not true that f(q) C f( p). Hence by (A.5), it follows that
there exists a j E N such that f~(p) - p~ and fi(p) ~ fj(q). Since j~ K, it follows
that j~ i. Hence, qi - p~ - f~(p) ~ fi(q) ? q~ which is a contradiction. ~
The proof of theorem 3.6 now follows from the remark that in the proofs of lem-
mas B,C,D above only (A.1), (A.2) and (A.3) ate used. So the proof of theorem 3.6
can proceed in the same way as that of theorem 3.5. ~
The examples (i) (ii) and (iii) above show that the axioms in theorem 3.6 are
independent.
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